Indonesia and Two Passports Without Indigenous Blood: FIFA Permits It, Public Opinion Does Not
**Core answer**: Maarten Paes and Ole Romeny are fully eligible to represent Indonesia under both Indonesian Citizenship Law No. 12/2006 and FIFA's grandparent-birthplace criterion. Neither possesses indigenous blood, but no rule requires it. The press's "legal loophole" framing is legally inaccurate. **Key facts**: - Maarten Paes (GK, born 1998) received FIFA change-of-association approval in August 2024, having previously represented Netherlands U21. - Ole Romeny (FW) swore his Indonesian naturalisation oath in February 2025, requiring no federation transfer. - Indonesia's route relies on Article 20, Law No. 12/2006, approved by the House of Representatives (DPR). - FIFA eligibility hinges on a biological grandparent's birthplace on federation territory, not on ethnicity. - Indonesia's diaspora pipeline (colonial-era blijvers descendants) is finite and non-renewable. **Source attribution**: Original analysis based on Kompas Indonesia reporting (2024-2025) and FIFA Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: Q: Is Indonesia's naturalisation of Paes and Romeny a legal loophole? A: No. It is a designed FIFA eligibility route based on grandparent birthplace, not a rule exploit. Q: Why do goalkeeper and centre-forward matter most in this recruitment pattern? A: These two positions carry the highest single-player leverage on match results, per the VangBong.vn Player Depth Index framework. Q: What is the main long-term risk for Indonesia's model? A: The colonial-era diaspora pool is finite, so the strategy cannot be sustained without parallel domestic academy investment.
In the file folder I reopened earlier this week, one number made me pause longer than expected: Maarten Paes, born 2026, plays goalkeeper, once represented the Netherlands U21. Ole Romeny plays centre-forward. Both wear the Indonesia national team shirt. Neither has a single drop of indigenous blood. And both are 100% eligible under FIFA rules and Indonesian citizenship law. I spent two evenings dissecting this case, not because its legal story is complicated, but because of how the regional press is narrating it: as a legal loophole, an exploited gap, a legalised cheating. The truth lies elsewhere. And that truth directly affects Vietnam football's regional standing, in a way that very few analyses are pointing out.

When 53,000 spectators fall silent, the numbers start to speak. But this time, the noise did not come from the stands. It came from the newsrooms.
Context must be placed correctly before dissection. Southeast Asian football over the past five years has entered a new cycle called the naturalisation cycle. The Philippines went first with a batch of Europe-rooted players with ancestors born in the archipelago. Malaysia began moving. Thailand had sporadic cases. But Indonesia is the most analysable case, not because they naturalise the most, but because they do it systematically, organisationally, and targeting exactly the two most pivotal positions on the pitch: goalkeeper and centre-forward. Regional football followers know this story is not new. What is new is the extent to which PSSI has poured administrative, legal and political resources into it, enough for Indonesia's House of Representatives to approve naturalisation decisions under the "national interest" clause of Article 20 of Citizenship Law No. 12/2026.

Data does not make revolutions. It only strips the paint off myths. And here, the paint to strip is the phrase "legal loophole".
Maarten Paes is the more delicate legal case of the two. Born in 2026 in the Netherlands, once capped for Netherlands U21, meaning he had represented another federation at youth international level. To switch to Indonesia, he needed a procedure called change of association, which FIFA permits only once in a player's career. According to documents I cross-checked across three sources, FIFA approved this switch for Paes in August 2026. Before that, Indonesian media reported PSSI had pursued the procedure "persistently" over an extended period, including verifying the birthplace of his grandparents, born in the Dutch East Indies colonial era. This is the crux most regional commentary overlooks: the criterion FIFA uses is not indigenous ethnicity, but the birthplace of a biological parent or grandparent. In other words, a person with a grandparent born on Indonesian territory, regardless of ethnicity, can meet the eligibility threshold to represent that federation under FIFA's Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes.
The legal asymmetry sits here: the press says "no indigenous blood", and that is biologically correct. But no clause in FIFA or Indonesian law requires a player to have indigenous blood. Eligibility is not synonymous with indigenous lineage. These are two entirely different stories, and the confusion between them is the source of most of the controversy.
Ole Romeny's case is procedurally simpler. He swore his naturalisation oath in February 2026, without going through the complicated federation-transfer procedure Paes required, because he had never represented the Netherlands at youth international level. But Romeny is tactically more important. Indonesia for years has been a team with a decent defensive line, an acceptable midfield, but always lacking a true number nine up front. Historical match records show they often lost games where they dominated possession, simply because nobody could finish. Securing a Europe-based centre-forward means Indonesia no longer has to play a brand of football reliant on set pieces or random situations to score.
Every number tells a story. The story is not in the number. The number here is two. Two players. Two positions with the highest result leverage on the pitch. That is not coincidence. A goalkeeper can save a team five points in a qualifying campaign. A striker can score seven goals in six matches. No other position on the pitch, except these two, can influence results so directly.
But here, I must turn in another direction. Because there is a bigger risk than legal risk, and it is downplayed by both the original article and regional opinion: Indonesia's naturalisation supply is finite, non-renewable, and running dry.
The transfer market is where impatience gets priced. And exactly the same is happening with the Southeast Asian naturalisation market, except the currency is not euros but administrative time.
Look at the nature of the model. Indonesia hunts for Europe-rooted players, mostly Dutch, with ancestors who were Dutch settlers in the Dutch East Indies, a group history calls blijvers, meaning "those who stayed". This is a closed, historical population that cannot multiply on demand for a football federation. Each successive generation will have fewer options, not more. You can keep finding cases like Paes in 2026, Romeny in 2026, and I know PSSI is targeting others like Haye or Verdong. But at some point, this pipeline runs dry. And when it does, if Indonesia has not simultaneously invested in domestic youth academies, they will enter a very uncomfortable hollow phase.
This is what Kompas Indonesia's original article does not address, and also what Southeast Asian commentary should make clearer. Naturalisation is not a development model, but a situational solution upgraded into a strategy. It can raise Indonesia's ceiling for the next three to five years, but simultaneously bets the entire long-term future on a reservoir that cannot refill itself.
Compare with Vietnam. We do not have a large-scale diaspora advantage like Indonesia. Our colonial history is different, and the number of Vietnamese settled in Europe across generations with professional football backgrounds is far smaller. That sounds like a disadvantage, but seen through a long-term lens, it forces us to do the harder but more sustainable work: building youth development systems and maintaining internal cohesion structures.
The empty stadium taught me that noise is data. And in this story, the noise from Indonesian newsrooms is saying something VFF managers should note: part of the Indonesian public is reacting strongly to the concept of grandparent-based naturalisation, even though it is fully legal. This is an interesting paradox. The same player, legal under the law, but emotionally unacceptable. And that is a type of risk no statute can protect against.
When does a naturalised goalkeeper get blamed for a conceded goal that a domestic goalkeeper would not be blamed for? When does a naturalised striker get called a mercenary after a match without a goal? The answer lies in communication management, in how PSSI and the coaching staff build the narrative around these players, and in how they themselves express attachment to the shirt. Data does not erase emotion. It explains why emotion exists.
There is one signal I want you to track over the next 12 to 18 months. Not the signal of how many more naturalised players Indonesia adds. But the signal of whether PSSI simultaneously announces a serious investment plan in domestic youth academies. If yes, this is a two-legged strategy, and Indonesia will be a regional force long-term. If not, this is merely a short-term race using resources inherited from history, a race that sooner or later will stop when the diaspora reservoir runs dry.
For Vietnam, the task is not to copy Indonesia's model. The task is to understand its structure, understand its limits, and ensure that when those limits appear, we are still standing firm on the regional pitch. Data tells us exactly what is being bet. Whether we read it correctly is a different question, and the answer only arrives after the final whistle of the next qualifying round.
